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of fire will live happily...and con­
tinue to contribute to the society”. 
At the same time "golden citations" 
for "Good Children who Revere the 
Aged” were also established. To 
vouchsafe the loyalty of its young 
people the revolutionary party that 
took as its cause a total break with 
the cru sh in g  tra d itio n s o f the 
Chinese past is in its own old age 
relying increasingly on "ancestor 
worship” and f il ia l p iety  w ith 
socialist characteristics.
In the sum m er o f 1988  Zhang 
Zhenglong, who was writing White 
Snow, Red Blood, was inspired by 
the news from the Soviet Union that 
high school history examinations 
were being can celled  and texts 
revised. He reflected on the relation­
ship between the makers and in­
heritors of history in China:
That final war [of 1948] laid
waste to the black earth of the
north-east. But since then what 
has continued to defile it? As 
it’s the grown-ups who’ve 
thrown the family chronicle 
into chaos, how can we ever 
hope that our children will 
continue it?...If you expect 
sincerity from your children, 
you must be honest yourself.
The dissident historian can thus be 
as threatening as the political ac­
tivist or pamphleteer.
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n the tenth anniversary 
of the Khmer Rouge ac­
cession to power in 
C a m b o d ia , Deng  
Aiaoping shocked those who saw 
China's foreign policy os deter­
mined by a fear of Soviet encircle­
ment. He said the USSR may "still 
retain the bases provided by Viet­
nam"— the former US military 
facilities at Cam Ranh Bay—if Mos­
cow stopped supporting Hanoi in 
Camboaia.
China had outlined its priorities. 
Beijing’s policy was less defensive 
against the Soviets than forward- 
looking, aimed at Southeast Asia, 
and locked in rivalry with Hanoi. 
Thus, after the Chinese invasion of 
Vietnam in February-March 1979 (in 
which Beijing lost 60,000 killed and 
wounded), Deng proclaimed that "it 
is wise for China to force the Viet­
namese to stay in Cambodia, be­
cause that way they will suffer more 
and more..,”.
T he G erm an C hina s p e c ia lis t  
Rudiger Machetzki has pointed out 
that from 1977 to 1980, only 5% of 
China’s anti-Soviet commentaries 
ap p eared  in d o m estic  C hinese 
media. Even in 1980, after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, all but 40 
out of 2,400 Chinese condemnations 
of the USSR were for foreign con­
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sumption only. By 1982, no more 
than one-third of the Chinese army 
was deployed facing the long Soviet 
border.
China had put three conditions— 
‘obstacles’— on normalisation of its 
relations with the USSR: Soviet 
troop red u ction s along C h in a’s 
northern border, withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and an end to support 
for Hanoi in Cambodia. In 1982, 
how ever, China made clear its 
priority demand: “the first signs of a 
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cam­
bod ia w ould be su ff ic ie n t  to 
facilitate progress in Sino-Soviet 
talks”. On 17 April 1985, Deng again 
suggested Moscow first remove the 
Cambodian ‘obstacle’, the only one 
of the three not bordering China.
During the O ctober 1985 Sino- 
Soviet normalisation talks in Beij­
ing, the S o v ie ts  proposed  to 
withdraw and demobilise some of 
their troops on the Chinese border. 
Beijing was barely interested. “In 
response the Chinese side said it 
would like to see some Soviet action 
in restraining Vietnam in  Cam­
bodia,” reported the Far Eastern 
Econom ic Beview  in 1985. Hanoi’s 
April 1989 pledge to leave Cam­
bodia by September smoothed the 
way for the May Sino-Soviet sum­
mit.
China is preoccupied with Vietnam 
because it sees Southeast Asia as 
more vital than West or North Asia. 
In the South China Sea, for instance, 
China far extends its claims to the 
Paracel and Spratley Island groups 
there. Beijing has described that 
ocean expanse as its own ‘territorial 
sea’, legally equivalent to an inland 
Chinese lake. This extraordinary 
claim would enable China to flank 
the long Vietnamese and Philippine 
coastlines, even bringing China a 
‘border’ standoff with distant In­
donesia.
In 1974 China seized the Paracel Is­
lands from the Saigon regime. By 
1988, Beijing was staging military 
exercises in disputed waters ‘with 
increasing regularity' as far south as 
an offsh ore re e f c la im ed  by 
Malaysia. In March 1988, China at­
tacked Vietnamese positions in the 
Spratleys, sinking three ships and 
killing nearly 100 troops. But Hanoi 
held on to most of the islands.
Beijing’s attack came a decade after 
China had ended conflict over its 
eastern maritime border, agreeing 
with Japan to shelve the issue of 
so vereig n ty  over the d isputed  
Diaoyutai islands. There, moreover, 
China has claimed no vast ‘ter­
ritorial sea’. The contrast with its 
South China Sea claim is striking.
O nly in 1 9 9 0 , after Hanoi had 
proved difficult to drive out of the 
Spratleys, and China’s international 
position had been weakened by the 
B e ijin g  m a ssa cre , the S o v ie t 
withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay, and 
the Vietnamese withdrawal from 
Cambodia, did Beijing offer even to 
negotiate over the Spratleys. It 
proposed that all parties jointly 
d evelop  them , ending H an o i’s 
m ilitary dom inance there, while 
m ain ta in in g  a n o n -n eg o tiab le  
C h in ese  m on op o ly  over the 
Paracels. If published in the domes­
tic Chinese media at the time (it was 
not), the proposal might have sig­
nalled a first step towards abandon­
ment of China’s claim to the whole 
South China Sea. But it would also 
advance China’s current position the 
most, while requiring the most con­
cessions from Hanoi, to whom it 
directs claims by the Philippines 
and Malaysia.
Anthony Barnett has suggested that 
China has its own Monroe Doctrine. 
B eijing eyes a Southeast A sian 
’backyard’ replicating US hegemony 
in Latin America. Referring to Viet­
nam as 'The Cuba of the East’, China 
(like the US) is frustrated by a former 
pet gone feral d efend ing its  
doorstep.
From early 1977, Khmer Rouge for­
ces attacked undisputed Vietnamese 
territory, massacring over 10,000 
Vietnamese civilians and causing 
hundreds of thousands to flee their 
hom es. H a n o i’s a cco u n t, co r­
roborated at the time by both US 
in te llig e n c e  and V ietn am ese 
refugees fleeing abroad from the war 
zone, has since been documented 
from both sides of the border. Before 
Vietnam had responded to these at­
tacks, China informed both sides 
that it supported Pol Pot's Cam­
bodia. In 1978, Vietnam offered to 
negotiate a ceasefire and settlement 
under international supervision. Pol 
Pot refused, and the war continued;
his Chinese support continued after 
Hanoi overthrew his regime in 1979.
“I do not understand why some 
people want to remove Pol Pot," 
Deng Xiaoping said in  1984. "It is 
true that he made some mistakes in 
the past but now he is leading the 
fight against the Vietnamese aggres­
so rs.” A Chinese diplom at con­
curred: “One should not talk of 
compromise” on Cambodia. Beijing 
may see the Khmer Rouge and their 
two allies (Norodom Sihanouk and 
Son Sann) replaying China’s own 
World War II anti-Japanese struggle, 
w hen th e  C h in ese  com m unist- 
united front tactics also gave bour­
geois allies two of ‘three-thirds’ of 
coalition posts. Sihanouk himself 
has attacked China's willingness to 
“fight to the last Cambodian”,
Since the collapse in the 1980s of the 
pro-Beijing communist insurgencies 
in Malaysia, Thailand and Burma, 
the Khmer Rouge is China’s last in­
ternational client force. Beijing will 
not be enticed to surrender them. 
Despite a previous undertaking to 
cut its arms supplies to them in 
return for Vietnam 's withdrawal 
from Cambodia, Beijing sent the 
Khmer Rouge a large shipment of 
w eap ons in  m id -1 9 9 0 . China 
provides the Khmer Rouge forces 
with USS100 million a year, accord­
ing to American intelligence. When 
iven the choice, China naturally 
locks the isolation of the Khmer 
Rouge. It also resists moves towards 
reg ion al co n co rd , preferring a 
balkanised Southeast Asia with 
‘many roads’ to Beijing. Yet any 
agreement to isolate the Khmer 
Rouge b etw een  V ietnam  and 
Thailand, if backed by ASEAN and 
the West, would be hard for Beijing 
to subvert. China would have to ac­
cept a bipartisan Southeast Asian 
settlement.
Precisely such a regional consen­
sus— exclusion of the Khmer Rouge 
in  retu rn  for th e  V ietnam ese 
withdrawal—was shunted aside by 
the 1 9 9 0  UN Secu rity  Council 
p ro p o sa l for C am bodia, That 
w eakened the Sou th east Asian 
nations' 1988 provision against "a 
recurrence of the genocidal policies 
and practices of the Pol Pot regime". 
It now reads blandly: “Necessary 
measures should be taken in order to 
observe human rights and ensure the
ALR : FEBRUARY 1991
China Supplement 35
non-return to the policies and prac­
tices of the past.” In effect, the UN 
has condoned genocide.
The UN’s Human Rights Sub-commis­
sion immediately dropped from its 
agenda a draft resolution on Cam­
bodia referring to "the atrocities 
reaching the level of genocide com­
mitted in particular during the period 
of Khmer Rouge rule”, and urging all 
states "to detect, arrest, extradite or 
bring to trial” and “to prevent the 
return to government positions of 
those who were responsible for 
genocidal actions during the period 
1975 to 1978”. The sub-commission 
dropped this text, according to 
Agence France Presse on 30 August 
1990, "after several speakers said it 
would render a disservice to the 
United Nations after the five per­
manent members of the UN Security 
Council issued a joint plan this week 
aimed at ending the fighting...”
China dreaded a successful Viet­
namese withdrawal from Cambodia, 
leaving an independent regime not 
hostile to Hanoi. But it happened, 
and the result has been a Chinese 
demand, with the West willingly co­
operating, for a unanimous ‘com­
prehensive settlement' —i.e. subject 
to the veto of China and the Khmer 
Rougo. It involves outside constraint 
of the only Cambodian opponents of 
the genocide, Hun Sen ’s Phnom 
Penh government.
In late November 1989, Australia’s 
Foreign M inister Gareth Evans 
launched his peace proposal for 
Cambodia, calling for a UN ad­
ministration to replace Hun Sen. But 
Evans refused to take any initiative 
against the Khmer Rouge, insisting 
on a solution acceptable to China. 
The effect of this kowtow has now 
been revealed by China's ambas­
sador in London: from the beginning 
of January 1990, Beijing began send­
ing tanks to the Khmer Rouge for the 
first time in 12 years. A witness 
reports five Chinese T-59 tanks were 
handed over to the Khmer Rouge 
near the Thai province of Trat on 21 
June. A total of 24 had arrived in 
Cambodia by October, according to 
Jane's D efence W eekly, w hich  
describes them as “the most sig­
nificant increase in firopower the 
resistance to the Vietnam ese-in­
stalled governm ent has ever 
received". Gareth Evans has denied
this, claiming "there is no evidence 
available to the Australian govern­
ment that the Khmer Rouge has 
recently received tanks from China. 
Indeed, the consensus among the ex­
perts is to the contrary.” No such 
co n sen su s e x is ts . W h ile  som e 
debate whether Thai forces have yet 
delivered some of the tanks to the 
Khmer Rouge, the Chinese definite­
ly despatched them in January 1990 
and the Khmer Rouge now have at 
least five and possibly as many as 28 
tanks. Evans was played on a break.
In 1990 the Harvard Human Rights 
Journal obtained confidential Pol 
Pot speeches recorded in briefing 
notes taken by two Khmer Rouge 
commanders who defected in 1989. 
They show Pol Pot’s conscious use
of the veto that Evans and the West 
have given him over the negotiation 
process, through their push for a 
‘com p rehensive se ttle m e n t'. In 
1988, Pol Pot secretly unfolded his 
Ians to “delay the elections” until 
is forces “control all the country", 
when his officials “will lead the bal­
loting work”. Khieu Samphan, his 
delegate to the negotiations, added: 
"The outside world keeps demand­
ing a political end to the war in 
Kampuchea. I could end the war 
now if I wanted, because the outside 
world is waiting for me, but I am 
buying time to give you comrades 
the opportunity to carry out ail the 
tasks... If it doesn’t end politically, 
and ends militarily, that’s good for 
us." Here Pol Pot interrupted, saying 
that "to end the war politically” 
would make his movement “fade 
away". "We must prevent this from 
happening.”
As I write, the Cambodian negotia­
tions remain stalled, and the UN 
fears to proceed against Khmer 
Rouge intransigence. Armed with
this veto, the Khmer Rouge have had 
a year’s valuable time to pursue their 
war aims. In 1990 they seized large 
areas of northern and western Cam­
bodia. They are in  a much better 
position now than in 1989 both to 
disguise their military forces and to 
control the outcome of any elec­
tions. There is no assurance that the 
UN is serious about disarming the 
Khmer Rouge and ensuring a fair 
election in IGimer Rouge-controlled 
villages. As Evans him self puts it: 
“There can be no guarantee that they 
will not resume fighting after the 
transitional period with weapons 
which have been hidden from the 
UN monitoring process.” But, he 
claims, “China will have given an 
international legal undertaking to 
cease arms supply to the Khmer 
Rouge, will be under close interna­
tional legal scrutiny to uphold that 
undertaking, and can be reasonably 
exp ected  to h onou r i t . ’’ G iven 
China’s broken promises in this 
regard, and the propensity of those 
promising ‘international scrutiny’ to 
cover for Beijing, no confidence is 
warranted here.
Pol Pot said in 1988 that, in the event 
of a settlement, "our troops will 
rem ain  in  the ju n g le  for se lf- 
defence”. They are not prepared to 
lay down their arms. In the same 
briefing, Pol Pot defended having 
massacred the defeated Lon Nol 
regime's officers, soldiers and offi­
cials in 1975: “This strata of the im­
p e r ia lis ts  had to be to ta lly  
d e stro y e d .” T he K hm er Rouge 
p red ict their retu rn  w ith this 
slogan: “When the water rises, the 
fish eat the ants, but when the water 
recedes, the ants eat the fish."
Wringing Cambodia dry for Pol Pot, 
the world enforces its economic and 
diplomatic blockade, in November 
1990, Gareth Evans did propose re­
e s ta b lish in g  an A u stra lian  
diplom atic presence in Phnom 
Penh. But like the 1987 proposal to 
take Pol Pot to the World Court for 
genocide, this was rejected by Prime 
M in iste r  Bob Hawke out of 
deference to China. If the Khmer 
Rouge returns to power, the Hawke 
governm ent w ill share respon­
sibility with China and the US.
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